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Abstract 
 
A rising Asia brings to the global arena a new set of increasingly influential players with their 
own values, histories and strategic considerations. It remains to be seen if these shifts will 
lead to a clash or convergence in the management of global issues. The critical issues include 
Asian actors’ treatment of sovereignty, their preferences on institutional design, and 
conceptions of their role in global governance. Global health is fraught with a whole range of 
collective action problems, which we are failing to address effectively with existing 
institutional arrangements. This is in part because these institutions are embedded in an 
anachronistic world order in which Asia is governed rather than governing. Bridging this 
disconnect will require multiple adjustments. Existing actors involved in setting global health 
rules will need to adjust to take into account opportunities, constraints and perspectives from 
the Asian region that may have thus far been neglected. At the same time, Asian state and 
non-state actors need to be engaged as co-shapers of the global order – not just in terms of 
material contributions to existing initiatives, but also in terms of leadership and ideas for 
reforming and strengthening current institutions. 
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GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE AND THE RISE OF ASIA 
 
Introduction 
 
This special section examines how the rise of Asia affects the challenge of governing health 
in a globalizing world. Asia has particular relevance as it is often depicted as the epicenter of 
many transnational health threats, e.g. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and 
avian influenza outbreaks.  Amid globalization and an emerging geopolitical multi-polarity, 
however, the world cannot be readily divided between the sources of such problems and the 
providers of their required solutions, between rule setters and rule takers, and between the 
governors and governed. The three papers presented here investigate how selected Asian state 
and non-state actors are engaging with efforts to govern global health.  
 
The evidence and arguments in this section draw from case studies carried out by the Global 
Health Study Group of the S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance, Lee Kuan Yew School of 
Public Policy, National University of Singapore.1 This overview paper sets out the major 
themes of the project and findings arising from the case studies. The next paper by Lee et al 
on ‘Asian Contributions to Three Instruments of Global Health Governance’ presents detailed 
analysis of Asian engagement with three instruments of global health governance - the 
International Health Regulations (IHR), Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework (PIPF) 
and Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The final paper by Florini et al on 
‘Global Health Governance: Analyzing China, India and Japan as Global Health Aid Donors’ 
goes in-depth into the health development assistance strategies of China, India and Japan 
against the backdrop of evolving discourses and practices in the global health governance 
arena. For the purposes of this special section, the term ‘Asia’ refers to those countries in 
South, Northeast and Southeast Asia.  The project has focused, in particular, on China, India, 
Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia as the most rapidly emerging leaders in the 
region and globally. It is argued that the findings and recommendations on global health 
governance have relevance for understanding Asia’s role in collective action on a range of 
other global issues, from energy and climate change, to the world economy and security, as 
well as to the study of global governance more broadly. 
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The Rise of Asia 
 
Developing Asia’s2 share of global gross domestic product (GDP) has tripled over the past 
three decades, growing from 8% in 1980 to 24% in 2010. The share of the Group of Seven 
(G7) countries, in contrast, has fallen from 56% to 40% over the same period.3 (IMF World 
Economic Outlook Database) The region has also made substantial progress in basic socio-
economic indicators. For example, China’s Human Development Index (HDI) score rose 
from 0.43 to 0.72, while Indonesia’s score rose from 0.47 to 0.69 between 1980 and 2010. 
(United Nations Development Program). As Asia achieves greater prosperity, and becomes 
more integrated with the world economy in the process, there are growing expectations for 
the region to make a fuller contribution to governing transnational problems such as 
economic crises, disease pandemics, climate change and transnational crime. However, there 
has been limited investigation to date of Asia’s role in global governance and, in particular, 
how the region has participated to date in decision-making processes to achieve collective 
action at the global level.  This includes its role in global health policy where Asian countries 
have been primarily cast as the source of threats (e.g. SARS, antimicrobial resistance, 
pandemic influenza, counterfeit medicines, climate change) or as protecting narrow national 
interests (e.g. Indonesia's refusal to share influenza virus samples), rather than as an active 
contributor to collective action. 
 
A fuller understanding of the role of Asia  is needed to address important gaps in how we 
understand global governance in an increasingly multi-polar world. Importantly, while the 
global governance literature has closely examined the normative and institutional plurality 
that currently exists,4 there has been limited investigation of the extent to which governance 
efforts and discourses have been unrepresentative and thus unevenly accepted across the 
world. Analyses of global governance to date have focused on multilateral initiatives, largely 
led by North America and Europe, impacting on the developing world.5 However, such 
approaches fail to take into account the dynamic nature of emerging institutional 
arrangements and, in particular, ongoing political, intellectual and normative shifts in the 
global (dis)order. How a rising Asia, with its  values, histories, worldviews and strategic 
considerations, will shape the future of global governance thus deserves far greater scholarly 
attention. To what extent will there be increased conflict or consensus, or even the emergence 
of new paradigms, in the governance of global issues? 
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The Challenge of Global Health Governance 
 
Among the major governance challenges the world faces, in an era of rapid and extensive 
globalization, are transnational threats to human health, including emerging and re-emerging 
infections, rising rates of chronic diseases, inadequate access to affordable and safe 
medicines, anti-microbial resistance and the health effects of climate change.  Effective 
collective action to address such threats, known as global health governance, is made more 
difficult by rising multi-polarity and enduring contestation over the meaning of sovereignty, 
and appropriate roles for state and non-state actors. At the same time, the rise of health on the 
global agenda has brought immense institutional innovation. Since the mid 1990s, 
widespread recognition of the need for effective collective action on global health has led to 
many new initiatives and arrangements, supported by the mobilization of unprecedented 
resources. For the most part, however, these institutional structures have evolved in an ad 
hoc, rather than systematic, manner and have been defined as much by political agendas as by 
global health needs. Most significantly, this institutional landscape has been characterized by 
diverse state and non-state actors, fragmented and often poorly coordinated activities, varied 
and sometimes competing normative frameworks and, above all, a lack of recognized overall 
authority to allocate responsibilities and resources. The end result is a lack of strategic 
coherence and major governance gaps in global health. In recent years, emerging regions 
such as Asia have begun to add their voices to the creation of global health governance 
arrangements.   
 
 
This paper draws together three key analytical themes undertaken within this study of Asia’s 
role in governing global health - Asian perspectives on sovereignty, Asian preferences on 
institutional design, and conceptions of Asia’s role in global governance. These themes were 
developed through a series of workshops and smaller discussions convened under the S.T. 
Lee Project, focused on identifying the key gaps in existing knowledge.  The findings on each 
of these themes, arising from the case studies of the project, are summarized in the following 
sections.  
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Sovereignty and Global Health in Asia 
 
On sovereignty, we are interested in examining how well traditional sovereignty functions as 
a principle for managing global issues amidst growing requirements for trans-boundary 
collective action. By taking a closer look at how Asian countries approach and use the 
sovereignty principle in managing different global health issues, we attempt to understand 
when, why, and how sovereignty is used as a governing principle. The case studies reveal 
several ways in which the sovereignty principle relaxes, clashes, converges and even evolves 
with governance objectives in global health. While there is evidence that national interests 
are sometimes pursued on the basis of sovereignty, and at the expense of global health 
outcomes, there are other instances where sovereignty concerns have been downplayed in 
favor of other goals. Asian states have also challenged global rules and regimes that have 
undermined health outcomes by contravening existing norms and pushing for greater national 
policy space. In other cases, sovereignty turns out to be a principle-of-last-resort in ordering 
relations in an ethnically and historically fractious region where trust remains thin. The multi-
faceted ways in which sovereignty and globalization interact calls for a systematic 
examination of why tensions arise, and for constructing policy responses that are similarly 
wide-ranging.  
 
Loosening and downplaying of sovereignty 
 
Several case studies show Asian states adopting positions that downplay the importance of 
sovereignty as an issue in global health, both at the individual state level and at the level of 
international negotiations. As Florini et al discuss in detail in their accompanying paper, 
Asian countries such as China and India have willingly engaged with a range of global health 
institutions when they have been recipients of foreign aid. These global health players and 
initiatives range from foreign private entities such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
(BMGF) to public-private partnerships like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (GFATM). However, these positive engagements are often embedded within a 
broader strategic context. In his study on the interaction between the BRIC6 countries and the 
international health community on dealing with HIV/AIDS, Gomez (2009) describes a twin 
dynamic of ‘receptivity’ and ‘resistance’ taking place. States such as India and China are 
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more receptive to the international health community when cooperation offers advantages of 
program expansion and reputation enhancement, or when there has been a history of 
collaboration. They have also resisted global health initiatives when there have been clashes 
with domestic policies, normative structures or pharmaceutical capacity. What these dual 
practices amount to is a growing strategic approach by these emerging nations. Gomez 
describes this as a demonstration by these countries that they are capable of dealing with their 
health issues – and as such a stronger exertion of their sovereignty.  That said, the definition 
of sovereignty being asserted here is arguably one that is more flexible (both ‘receptive’ and 
‘resistant’ depending on circumstances), and which implicitly accepts the legitimacy of 
engaging with non-state actors and non-traditional initiatives in the global health community.    
 
In global rule-making efforts such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) revision 
process, various Asian participants raised objections during negotiations on the basis of 
sovereignty concerns. However, these concerns did not impede the successful revision of the 
IHR (details in Lee et al). The 2005 IHR represent a significant revision of outdated rules 
surrounding the governance of international disease threats. The new regulations expands the 
scope of diseases covered, strengthens the way in which information on disease events is 
used and shared, clarifies the responsibilities of states in their surveillance and response to 
potential health threats, and gives added authority to the WHO. The WHO can seek 
verification from state parties on disease events, and state parties are obliged to respond to 
the requests. Finally, the WHO is also able to share information from non-governmental 
sources with both state parties and inter-governmental organizations (Fidler and Gostin, 
2006). During negotiations, the Chinese government objected to the IHR text on grounds of 
sovereignty in two areas – first in disease surveillance, reporting and investigation 
mechanisms, and second in the status and representation of Taiwan.  Lee et al detail the 
process of the IHR negotiations and the IHR was successfully revised despite these concerns, 
providing some evidence of the ‘loosening’ or re-configuration of the sovereignty principle 
vis-a-vis the need to formulate new rules for governing global health.  
 
The FCTC negotiations to come up with global rules for tobacco control provide hints of how 
Asian countries can and have actively shaped new understandings of how to balance 
sovereignty and global health needs. Of course, the positions of Asian participants were 
highly diverse. The Japan tobacco industry, for example, argued for national governments to 
retain control over what forms of regulation was best suited to their respective countries but 
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Japan ultimately ratified the FCTC. In contrast, Thailand and India played leading roles in 
negotiating a framework for tobacco control that moved state parties away from interests 
defined by territorial boundaries and towards transnational notions of public health protection 
(see details in Lee et al). The FCTC therefore represents an interesting case of some Asian 
states not just acceding to, but actively shaping, new rules of global governance that reflect a 
more flexible understanding of sovereignty. 
 
Sovereignty as a tool to advance national interests 
 
For the issue areas analysed for this project, there appears to be a preference in Asia for 
promoting state-centric forms of cooperation. The clearest evidence for this comes from the 
behaviour of countries such as Japan, China and India as donors in development assistance 
for health (DAH). Foreign aid is an area where the state has a high degree of discretion in 
setting the rules of engagement. As Florini et al (this issue) elaborate, Japan, China and India 
have all adopted DAH policy rhetoric that reflect a sensitivity towards respecting the 
sovereignty of recipient nations. Moreover, the three countries’ management of DAH are all 
strongly driven by their respective foreign affairs ministries. These agencies in turn are likely 
to formulate policies to advance sovereign, rather than global health, interests. The 
institutions and mechanisms that the three countries have chosen to channel their 
development assistance further underscore preferences for state-centric modes of cooperation 
that further national objectives. What these objectives are, however, vary according to 
domestic context. 
 
That said, the environment for emerging donors is highly dynamic, and the DAH strategies of 
the three countries are evolving – though in different directions. Florini et al (this issue) 
describe how Japan has revised its foreign aid principles, which are today framed under the 
concept of Human Security – defined less by territorial boundaries and more by universal 
human needs. Japan has also played a leading role in promoting health in different high-level 
multilateral fora such as the G-8. Increasing scrutiny over China’s international behavior, and 
growing expectations for China to be a responsible stakeholder, have also pushed China to 
clarify its role in managing global issues. In contrast to Japan, China’s White Paper on 
Foreign Aid, issued in April 2011, staunchly upholds the principles of non-interference and 
equality.7 These various developments underline the non-linear and complex ways in which 
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major and emerging Asian powers will challenge, influence and be shaped by current 
development discourses.  
 
Sovereignty as a tool to challenge global rules  
 
The sovereignty principle was also found to be employed, in some cases, to challenge global 
rules perceived to be unfair and detrimental to public health outcomes. In relation to 
intellectual property (IP) rights, for example, the TRIPS regime severely constrained the 
national policy space for access to medicines for developing countries in the 1990s. Moon 
and Szlezak (2012, Forthcoming) point out that while the formal TRIPS regime allowed 
governments flexibilities such as compulsory licensing, in practice the political space for 
exercising such options was restricted by external pressure and trade interests. They further 
detail how the actions of governments and civil society in Malaysia, Thailand and India 
championed new rules that challenged TRIPS and re-asserted health-centered interests. 
However, the authors carefully note that it was not simply governments fighting to 
reestablish national policy space. Instead, efforts were made in collaboration with civil 
society, transnational coalitions, international organizations and the scientific community to 
reassert the right of WTO member states to use flexibilities on the grounds of protecting 
national public health interests: ‘Thus, in a globalizing system, the reassertion of sovereignty 
was made possible by taking a more permeable approach to the very concept of sovereignty.’ 
 
In another example, Indonesia announced in 2007 that it would withhold H5N1 influenza 
virus samples from the WHO on the grounds of inequities in rules surrounding access to anti-
viral drugs and vaccines (Jakarta Post, 2007). The government framed its protest around the 
notion of ‘viral sovereignty’. Indonesia’s assertion sparked global controversy, and was 
criticized for being based on outdated notions of sovereignty that dangerously undermined 
collective global health security (Holbrooke and Garrett, 2008). However, the country’s 
protest nonetheless highlighted fundamental inequities in the system of vaccine production 
and access, that some low and middle-income countries identified with. . The challenge of 
existing virus-sharing norms led to the creation of new rules under the Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Framework (PIPF) regarding virus sharing, intellectual property, and revised 
responsibilities for drug manufacturers (see Lee et al (this issue), and Fidler and Gostin, 
2011). 
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Sovereignty as the lowest common denominator  
 
Finally, one reason for the strong reliance on state-centric modes of cooperation in Asia 
appears to be the presence of historically deep political, ethnic, religious and economic 
divisions within the region that continue today to hinder collective action. The absence of 
trust or agreed norms of cross-border cooperation has hindered modes of collaboration that 
might bring in more diverse actors working in trans-border partnerships or networks. 
Sovereignty has instead ordered relations between a set of politically, ethnically and 
geographically diverse grouping of nations. Lee et al (this issue) examines the governance 
gaps that has resulted from this state of affairs. For example, pandemic governance has 
focused on at the border controls, rather than on a systemic strengthening that transverses 
state territories. In addition, the region’s deep adherence to the norm of non-interference has 
created a policy environment where transnational issues of mutual concern are not discussed, 
for fear of infringing upon the domestic affairs of other states. We elaborate on this issue in 
the section below on institutional diversity. 
 
Understanding sovereignty through multiple lenses 
 
The multiplying transnational governance challenges wrought by globalization bring new 
tensions to the relevance and application of the sovereignty principle in global affairs. Indeed, 
there are plenty of examples of rising Asian countries using sovereignty as a tool to advance 
their individual national interest – often to the detriment of global governance needs. 
However, the evidence summarized here also suggests that a focus only on this clash may 
yield limited insights into how global governance can be strengthened. Indeed, the 
sovereignty principle can be equally used to either advance individual national interest at the 
expense of global public needs, or in order to address inequities in the global system of rules 
and norms, or simply to maintain peace and stability in the absence of deeper institutional 
arrangements. These difficult tensions point to the need to analyze sovereignty and 
globalization through multiple perspectives, and to distinguish between different sources of 
tension.  
 
In cases where global rules and standards are driven by one dominant set of interests, or 
without participation from critical stakeholders, governance mechanisms can be perceived as 
illegitimate, inequitable and ill-fitted for the world’s diversity of socio-economic settings. In 
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such situations, sovereignty remains a useful tool that states can wield to push for a revision 
of the rules. Even in such cases, as the experience of Thailand, India and Malaysia in 
influencing new norms for IP and access to medicines demonstrate, assertions of sovereignty 
under conditions of globalization are more effective when undertaken with the participation 
of transnational networks and non-state actors. In other cases, where a lack of trust 
undermines global governance, the problem lies with an absence of alternative mechanisms 
that can create new incentives for collective action.  
 
As such, recommendations for improving global health governance should derive from the 
motivating factors behind various uses of the sovereignty principle. Rather than acting at 
odds to each other, sovereignty and globalization could instead be understood as being 
‘mutually embedded’ (Väyrynen, 2001). A more flexible and multi-dimensional approach to 
devising policy responses could be considered. If sovereignty is being used as a tool for 
advancing individual national interest, an examination of the political economy behind 
national interest formation could open up avenues to push for a more health-centric and 
transnational construction of foreign policy goals. If sovereignty is being used as a tool to 
challenge existing global rules, an assessment of the process by which these rules are made, 
and adjustments to include neglected voices and concerns, might be in order. If sovereignty is 
being used as a last-resort principle to order relations in the absence of trust, then confidence 
building at the regional level, or a focus on informal institutions and networks, might offer 
progress in improving health outcomes.  
 
 
Diversity and Preferences in Institutional Design 
 
The preceding discussion on sovereignty underscores the challenge of designing institutions 
to effectively take into account the myriad factors and alignment of interests involved in 
governing global health. On the one hand, allowing space for innovation in governance 
structures allows for experimentation in collective action to manage transnational problems. 
On the other hand, the anarchic policy environment with its multiplicity of interests, norms 
and actors can lead to incoherence and fragmentation. In this section, we examine how Asian 
actors are engaging with institutional pluralism from two angles: the composition of state and 
non-state actors across the governance of various health issues, and connections between 
global, regional and local institutions. The underlying question is whether health outcomes 
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are enriched or weakened by the institutional diversity in the global health governance 
landscape, and the roles played by Asian actors – whether they are acting as governors 
influencing the shape of various institutions, or being governed across different health issues. 
 
Horizontal diversity across issues 
 
The degree of institutional diversity and effectiveness in global governance varies according 
to the subject of regulation and alignment of interests. This project found varying forms of 
state engagement in Asia across a range of different institutional designs, from DAH to 
international arrangements such as the PIPF, IHR and FCTC.   
 
In DAH, Florini et al (this issue) find a disconnect between the role of Asian actors as 
recipients versus donors of aid that mirrors their, at times, variable positions on sovereignty. 
As aid recipients, India and China accept and engage with a diversity of institutions and 
actors, and have provided fairly open operating space to these actors (e.g. the Global Fund, 
and the Ford, Clinton and Gates Foundations). As donors, however, India and China prefer to 
engage bilaterally rather than multilaterally. They tend to be focused on state-to-state 
partnerships, with contributions tending to be largely material rather than ideational. This 
balance of priorities begs the question of what other health problems are being neglected, and 
what opportunities are lost in terms of tapping into the capacity of non-state actors to play 
governance functions that governments, acting alone and within territorial jurisdictions, 
cannot address.  
 
In governing pandemic influenza with the aforementioned PIPF, and governing disease 
outbreaks with the 2005 revised IHR, there appears to be a disconnect in Asia countries 
between a recognition of the potentially transboundary nature of infectious disease outbreaks, 
and the institutional responses that remain based on state-centric mechanisms. The SARS 
outbreak alerted the world to the need to strengthen global governance around pandemic 
influenza, giving state agencies a much-needed prompt to revitalize efforts to update the IHR. 
The surveillance aspect of the IHR has arguably been enhanced through the provision 
allowing the use of non-state sources of information. However, as Lee et al (this issue) 
describe, Asian countries did not play an active role in the revision process, and participation 
was highly state-centric. Similarly with pandemic preparedness, efforts in Asia have revolved 
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around governments and to a lesser extent international or regional inter-governmental 
organizations.  
 
In other, less traditional institutional arenas that actively engage non-state actors in new 
forms of decision-making, it is difficult to characterize a common approach by Asian states. 
One example is tobacco control. The FCTC process represented an innovative approach to 
drafting global rules, at least on health, by incorporating participation by a range of 
stakeholders (e.g. the public health community, industry, farmers) in a public hearing and 
allowing participation by NGOs with official relations with the WHO as observers and 
providers of unofficial briefings during negotiations. While Japan and China played the role 
of spoilers during the negotiations, the enhanced role given to NGOs was central to raising 
attention and scrutiny over the pro-tobacco stance of the Japanese and Chinese governments, 
and eventually in pressuring the two countries to adjust their positions somewhat. The 
governments of India and Thailand, moreover, played leading roles in the successful 
negotiation of the Framework, with Thailand pushing strongly for the participation of NGOs 
(details in Lee et al, this issue and Lee and Kao, 2012, Forthcoming). 
 
Domestic foundations to global institutions 
 
Our findings suggest that the degree and nature of Asia’s role in influencing global health 
institutions depend very much on domestic decision-making structures, as demonstrated 
through the leadership roles played by India and Thailand in shaping the FCTC. As Lee et al 
(this issue) point out, the open participation and engagement of civil society in India and 
Thailand’s domestic health policy process was directly related to these countries’ support at 
the global level for the FCTC to include substantive voice and responsibilities for NGOs. 
Regarding access to medicines, India and Thailand again were leaders in developing national 
intellectual property institutions that advanced public health interests. Moon and Szlezak 
(2012, Forthcoming) attribute India and Thailand’s challenging of existing IP rules to the 
close networks between their civil societies and governments to the global access to 
medicines movement, as well as the political space afforded to civil society to influence IP 
policies through both the legal and administrative systems. China’s IP institutions, in 
contrast, have not taken public health concerns into account. The authors argue that China’s 
domestic and external policy environment has much to do with this difference – the 
heightened trade pressure on China to toughen its IP standards, the narrower space for civil 
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society to operate in China, and the thinner ties between domestic NGOs and global public 
health networks.  
 
In DAH, the domestic health needs and institutional environments in Japan, India and China 
similarly shape these countries’ approach in addressing public health needs at regional and 
global levels. Florini et al (this issue) elaborate how the bureaucratic fragmentation of 
agencies dealing with overseas assistance in China and India has created DAH policies that 
do not amount to any focused or coherent approach on health. Japan, in contrast, has a more 
structured inter-agency process and one implementing agency (the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency). While Japan frequently engages the participation of non-state actors in 
the formation of state DAH policies, China and India have not allowed non-state actors to 
play much of a role. The lack of participation by non-state actors – particularly civil society – 
is mirrored by the state-centric nature of resulting policies. The result is that China and 
India’s domestic DAH policy communities are disconnected from broader discourses on 
global health governance.  
 
Regional institutions 
 
 
Our research has found that the political diversity in Asia, and lack of consensus about what 
role the region should play in managing trans-national health problems, and thus which 
institutions work best, has hindered the building of regional institutions. Asian countries 
(except for China) were largely disengaged from the IHR negotiations, and regional 
institutions played no role either in the preparatory stages or actual intergovernmental 
discussions. As Lee et al (this issue) describe, ‘Asian governments approached the IHR in an 
individualistic and state-centric manner, declining to form regional alliances.’ While ASEAN 
and APEC were active in organizing cooperative efforts and discussions on pandemic 
preparedness, they were also heavily criticized for being inefficient and ineffective. Historical 
mistrust, socio-economic and political diversity within the region were cited as standing in 
the way of cross-border collaboration. In terms of material contributions to global health, 
Florini et al (this issue) note that the amount of funding that the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) channels to health projects has been minimal (1% in FY 2009). As the number of 
issues requiring collective action multiplies, the weaknesses of Asia’s regional institutions 
are coming under increasing critique.8 It is precisely because trust appeared so thin in Asia, 
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and countries are at such varied stages of economic development, that the core function of 
these intergovernmental institutions is seen as minimizing conflict and maintaining stability, 
rather than fulfilling broader regional governance needs. This is the corollary to the region’s 
attachment to sovereignty as an organizing principle to preserve peace. 
 
However, the case studies also reveal some areas where the actual functions of managing 
trans-border issues are being built within the region, and where historical differences can be 
overcome. Evidence suggests that in some issue areas, elite-level policy negotiations through 
informal networks play a stronger role in governance than formal regional organizations. In 
pandemic preparedness, for example, Kamradt-Scott et al (2012, Forthcoming) observe that 
for the IHR, ‘(m)any of the new links are based on informal networks between public health 
and scientific colleagues who share information on a regular basis via email, telephone, or the 
Internet. Many of these professional networks have not been documented, and have emerged 
distinct from more formalized intergovernmental processes.’ In addition, the FCTC 
experience demonstrates the potential of regional institutions to play a part in negotiating the 
heterogeneous preferences within Asia. Lee et al (this issue) detail the role that WHO’s 
Southeast Asia Regional Office (SEARO) and ASEAN both played in balancing the wide-
ranging tobacco interests in the region, and in building regional consensus prior to 
discussions at the global level.9 This case study suggests that the enduring hostilities that 
divide Asian countries might be overcome to address specific issue-areas, in the presence of 
strong leadership and where domestic constituencies are included in policy processes. 
 
Vertical Connections – from local to global 
 
It has been frequently observed that the institutional environment in global health is currently 
marked by fragmentation10. Mechanisms are heterogeneous across different issues and 
operate in silos. Policies and actors are disconnected vertically between local, regional and 
global levels. The result is an institutional landscape lacking in coherence to address 
globalizing health problems. Be it in DAH, in pandemic preparedness or revising the IHR, 
Asian actors have by and large also preferred to act individually rather than collectively. 
Exceptions to the rule exist, of course, as the papers in this special section point out. 
Nonetheless, the tendency is for global health issues to be shaped by independently driven 
and state-centric approaches. One longer term implication, therefore, is that the emerging 
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multi-polarity in global affairs to likely to lead to a further fragmentation of global health 
institutions. 
 
These disconnects apply not just to the formulation of rules for global health, but also with 
implementation. In pandemic preparedness, the IHR and tobacco control, implementation is 
left to the national level without strong enforcement by global institutions. This point is 
particularly relevant for Asia because, while some countries in the region are rapidly 
modernizing and becoming more economically powerful, their social and institutional 
development has lagged behind. The result is greater globalization of health issues, but 
without requisite institutional capacity to respond to multiplying health needs. 
 
In sum, Asia’s engagement with and promotion of different institutional designs vary 
horizontally across issue areas and vertically through global, regional and local levels. As 
health aid recipients, Asian states have shown a willingness to engage with a whole range of 
state and non-state actors, and transnational public-private partnerships such as GFATM. As 
health aid donors, however, states such as India and China have chosen to focus on state-
centric relationships and projects. On the whole, there appears to be a regional preference for 
using state-centric mechanisms to manage health problems, although as discusses earlier, the 
make-up of local political structures matter as well. Those countries, whose domestic 
processes included participation from non-state actors correspondingly either promoted or 
were open to institutional designs that afforded greater diversity of partners at the supra-
national level. The role of regional organizations such as ASEAN or WHO regional offices 
appears to be highly varying. ASEAN was found to be highly ineffective in managing issues 
such as pandemic influenza governance and played no role in fostering discussions in the 
run-up to IHR negotiations. In the FCTC, however, regional-level discussions were critical in 
resolving differences and consolidating positions in the WHO negotiations. The precise 
factors driving this variance are a topic deserving further research.  
 
Conceptions and Contributions from Asia 
 
We now turn to the third analytical theme on conceptions from Asia on global governance 
and Asia’s role in managing global health problems. Normatively, there has been an 
explosion in the ideas, principles and ethics that shape efforts to govern global health. Each 
competing viewpoint is promoted by a different combination of interests and actors, with the 
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result that none of the various conceptualizations of global health is universally accepted (Lee 
2009, Dodgson and Lee 2004). Existing literature on global health governance extensively 
maps out the development of these various normative approaches and discourses in global 
health.11 The range of conceptions includes, among others: (a) market-based approaches of 
production and delivery of health goods; (b) universalist approaches grounded in the right to 
health, equity, social transformations and community empowerment; (c) global security 
implications of poor health policies; and (d) scientific approaches to health promotion 
focused on specific diseases and targeted medical interventions (for a detailed discussion see 
Lee 2009). The literature has paid less attention to the degree to which these various 
conceptions are accepted or rejected across different geographic regions. As the world 
continues to grow more interdependent, it will become increasingly important to understand 
how state and non-state players from China, Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, India, and so on, 
conceive health problems domestically and globally, and correspondingly, how these 
conceptions shape their contributions to global health governance.  
 
Building an inclusive understanding of global health governance 
 
Rather than a common ‘Asian’ conception of global health governance, the case studies 
reveal incoherence and a tendency for health to be framed and managed piecemeal. The 
region’s immense political diversity further impedes the formation of common approaches to 
dealing with global health issues. The case studies presented in this special section have, with 
exceptions, shown a state-centric, and fairly passive approach to managing global health in 
Asia. Florini et al (this issue) underscore that China and India’s contributions to global health 
remain material rather than ideational, but also note that both countries are becoming more 
active donors. The passive disengagement of Asian participants in the IHR negotiations show 
that actors in the region remain content with letting others shape the rules in some global 
health issues. Nor has our research found that regional institutions are playing a strong role in 
bridging the normative and conceptual divides at the global and local levels. In intellectual 
property and access to medicines, for example, Moon and Szlezak (2012, Forthcoming) point 
out that the positions of various Asian states are driven, not by any shared conception of IP or 
cultural or historical basis, but rather by their individual level of economic growth and degree 
of political space offered for civil society participation.  
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This gap between the growing expectations for emerging Asia to play a larger role in global 
health governance, and the nature of engagement found in our research, suggests that a rising 
Asia is being governed by global rules set elsewhere, insofar as many remain recipients of aid 
and most have not played an active part in setting the rules surrounding many of the current 
initiatives. Moreover, existing global institutions remain largely perceived as entrenched 
within rules set by a small number of high-income countries, even as the issues requiring 
collective action challenge the scope and capacity of these institutions. The concept of 
‘global health governance’ as it has been defined and debated in the literature and in global 
policy circles, does not appear to be a concept that is actively ‘owned’ and debated within 
Asia. The result is a disconnect between emerging conceptions of ‘global health governance’, 
as debated and promoted by scholarly and policy communities worldwide, and the 
engagement with global health policies within the Asian region. As such, there is a risk that 
as Asia continues to develop economically, health issues becomes subsumed and governed 
piecemeal under the other driving forces – such as in foreign policy or economic competition. 
These considerations point to a need for more coordinated efforts to manage the twin 
dynamics of globalization and the rise of Asia. A whole range of effort is needed, from trust 
and capacity building across borders, to pushing for greater political leadership, and 
generating a more inclusive dialogue on the meaning, challenges and responsibilities of 
global health governance.  
 
Health as the Vanguard of Global Governance? 
 
Analysis of Asia’s rise in relation to the region’s engagement with global health governance 
has implications beyond the field of health. There is relative consensus worldwide on the 
importance of strengthening collective action to address global health needs. This is reflected 
in the increased attention to global health in foreign policy.  . As such, even those countries 
that take more traditional views on sovereignty and world order are more likely to take a 
positive stance towards cooperation with global civil society and other non-state actors on 
health. These factors combine to suggest that innovations in global health governance could 
be at the vanguard of developments in global governance more generally.  
 
However, insofar as we can imagine a future where Asian countries are increasingly willing 
to challenge the status quo, it is not clear what new rules and norms will be put forth. Fidler 
(2012, Forthcoming) contends that Asian countries’ commitment to the Five Principles of 
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Peaceful Co-Existence12 will shape the nature of their engagement with global governance. 
Given that sovereignty and non-interference sits as a core tenet in the Five Principles, there 
could be a potential clash with existing discourses in global health governance that advocate 
more flexible interpretations of sovereignty and the role of non-state actors. Fidler (2012, 
Forthcoming) also cites Ginsburg’s argument, that ‘[t]he greatest conceptual innovation of 
Asian states in international law in the past several decades has been a regressive one, namely 
the idea that ‘Asian values’ offered an alternative to liberal universalism’.  
 
Evidence from this project provides support for both of these arguments. As an aid recipient, 
China has demonstrated its willingness to engage non-state actors and innovative global 
initiatives that do not adhere to classical interpretations of sovereignty. China’s ratification of 
the FCTC, despite the political strength of its domestic tobacco industry, may also 
demonstrate China’s desire to be seen as a responsible emerging power (Lee and Kao, 2012, 
Forthcoming). Asian countries are also becoming more active participants (though not 
leaders or rule-setters) in some innovative global health governance efforts, such as the 
GFATM and the GAVI Alliance (Fidler, 2012, Forthcoming).  
 
There are growing examples of Asian countries taking leadership roles and asserting 
themselves to advance health-centric goals. For example, Japan has championed health issues 
at the 1994 Global Issues Initiative on Population and AIDS and the 2000 and 2008 G-8 
meetings (Florini et al, this issue), while Thailand and India have effectively altered the status 
quo on the rules governing access to medicines (Moon and Szlezak, 2012, Forthcoming). 
India and Thailand’s leadership in the FCTC process, in particular, demonstrates the potential 
for Asian countries to proactively shape new rules in global health governance (Lee and Kao, 
2012, Forthcoming). It also shows that, in the presence of effective leadership supported by 
open and participatory domestic decision-making structures, regional solidarity can be built 
and historical mistrust overcome. 
 
In the area of DAH, however, where states are able to proactively set the rules, the nature of 
their health assistance is very much entrenched within a worldview emphasizing classical 
notions of sovereignty, utilizing traditional tools and relying mainly on state-to-state 
cooperation (Florini et al, this section). Huang Yanzhong (2010) suggests that the disconnect, 
in the case of China, arises out of a fundamental difference in world view: ‘Although China 
recognizes that solutions to global health problems necessitate neoliberal strategies of 
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cooperation over disease prevention and control, its actions on global health problems are 
still justified from the lens of classical realism that focuses on power, influence, and 
security.’ 
 
Asian efforts to strengthen pandemic preparedness further revealed a clear preference for 
state-based action to deal with what has been accepted as a trans-border issue. Institutional 
responses have lagged behind conceptual understandings of the transnational problem at 
hand. It is important, however, to reiterate that the roots of the region’s commitment to state-
based responses and to classical sovereignty are not solely about conceptual disconnects. The 
lack of trust, and historical and socio-economic diversity remains a fundamental barrier to 
collective action. The lack of institutional capacity to implement basic response and 
regulatory functions, further impedes more innovative trans-boundary solutions.  
 
Health Cooperation versus Competition 
 
Emerging multi-polarity will intensify normative debates in global governance. In areas 
where health objectives are poorly conceived and weakly governed, the potential for strategic 
competition to outweigh governance needs will heighten. For example, health development 
aid in China and India are largely shaped by ministries such as foreign affairs and commerce. 
Huang (2010) articulates the risks of this approach of health clearly:  
 
China’s active engagement in global health is primarily driven by a foreign policy 
agenda that focuses on expanding international influence while improving 
international image. … The danger is that when health is placed in the realm of 
realpolitik, it runs the risk of being “dependent on the logic of such politics—which is 
not based on science and not subject to public deliberation and peer review, but on the 
Machiavellian instincts of those in power.” 
 
Therefore, as long as health is conceived in these countries as a foreign policy tool, it might 
increasingly be a source of competition, rather than collective action, across countries. The 
resulting governance gaps and policy distortions are plentiful. In terms of health aid, while 
there are severe capacity deficits in many health systems in Asia that hamper the 
implementation of the IHR or of efforts to strengthen pandemic preparedness, Asian donors 
are not channeling resources into this area. 
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Indeed, the sources of competition extend beyond aid. As Moon and Szlezak (2012, 
Forthcoming) point out, India and China’s capacities in pharmaceutical R&D are expanding 
with the active investment from multinational companies, local firms, academic and 
government institutions. These countries would in time become net exporters of IP products. 
As such, the potential for the logic of economic competition to take priority over health needs 
will continue to expand. Insofar as there tend to be less clear state-corporate divisions in 
some parts of Asia (e.g. those societies that have developed through state corporatist or 
market authoritarian models), the economic rise of these countries bring interesting 
implications for how the rules surrounding global health IP issues will be influenced and re-
shaped. 
 
Fidler (2012, Forthcoming) warns that not only would such competition deepen forces that 
are fragmenting global health governance initiatives, but that resulting policies will 
increasingly serve narrow state interests rather than the objective of advancing global health 
through collective action. In the absence of agreed objectives, rules and enforcement 
mechanisms, commercial or national strategic interests will continue to play a dominant role 
in driving the substance and direction of the vast array of health research activities. The risks 
of this situation are that the needs of disenfranchised populations are not met, and their voices 
not included in the decision-making process. 
 
A Call for Constructive Dialogue 
 
The fundamental question connecting the above discussions is whether emerging multi-
polarity in global affairs will make it even harder to build a consensus around the objectives 
and rules of global health governance, with multiplying normative sources of conflict in the 
face of deepening interdependencies. Another question is whether these dynamics are taking 
place with an inclusive and representative debate on sovereignty and the norms by which 
global health ought to be governed.  
 
It is not clear if the much-needed discussions on sovereignty and global health governance 
are taking place in policy and academic communities in Asia – domestically and regionally. It 
is even less clear as to whether conversations of this nature are taking place across East and 
West. Without an active debate, the danger is that health governance in Asia will continue to 
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rely heavily, by default, on state-based and state-led mechanisms, possibly leading to a 
weakening of efforts to strengthen global health governance. Another danger is that by 
refusing to engage on the wider debate on sovereignty, Asia will be left to accept the rules 
that get revised, and concerns and perspectives from the region will end up being neglected.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The search for effective global governance, to enable collective action on a broad range of 
transnational challenges, requires deeper understanding of the role of rising states, the 
increased importance of non-state actors, and a re-assessment of the relationship between 
sovereignty and globalization. Global health governance is an opportunity to make progress 
on this process because of the universal recognition of the core importance of health to 
human well-being. 
 
However, this is not to say that global health governance is not highly political and fraught 
with contestation.  As the case studies of this project demonstrate, international relations is 
riddled with a whole range of collective action problems which are failing to be addressed 
effectively by  existing institutional arrangements. This is, in large part, because they are 
embedded in an anachronistic world order in which Asia, is being governed rather than 
participating in governing. Bridging this disconnect will require geopolitical, institutional and 
ideational adjustments. The setting of future global health rules will need to take into account 
opportunities, constraints and perspectives from emerging regions such as Asia that have thus 
far been relatively neglected. Such adjustments require a reconsideration, not just of decision-
making processes, but also preferences for institutional forms and normative frameworks. At 
the same time, Asian state and non-state actors need to be engaged as co-shapers of the global 
order – not just in terms of contributing material resources and participation in existing 
initiatives, but also in terms of leadership and ideas for reforming and strengthening current 
institutions.  
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Policy Implications 
 
• Sovereignty is asserted in a variety of ways across different global health issues, and 
policy responses should therefore be similarly diverse, tailored to the specific factors 
present in each context. .  
 
• Governance structures at the global level are not only shaped by state actors, but can be 
shaped in part by bottom-up policy processes.  This is a reflection of the degree to which 
domestic environments allow for non-state actor participation, as well as how these local 
actors are connected to transnational networks and discourses.  
 
• The implementation of global rules remains dependent on local capacity and political 
will. As such, more donor attention (including Asian donors) could be called to the 
institutional weaknesses in the Asian region.  
 
• While regional organizations remain focused on maintaining stability, the FCTC 
experience has shown that regional distrust can be overcome in the presence of leadership 
and with inclusive national-level policy processes. . 
 
• Emerging multi-polarity threatens to deepen strategic competition between powerful and 
rising states, thereby further fragmenting efforts to govern global health  Such 
competition could be mitigated by empowering a greater range of actors in Asia with 
interests in advancing health needs.  
 
• Asian state and non-state actors have an opportunity to play a bigger role in reforming 
existing global health governance institutions. One way to facilitate this stronger 
governance role is to foster inclusive dialogue and constructive debate on the importance 
of global health governance in the region.  
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1 The case studies examined the role of Asian countries in the governance of the following health issues: 
Development assistance for health, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the 2005 revision 
of the International Health Regulations (IHR), pandemic influenza preparedness, global health research, and 
intellectual property. In addition, papers were commissioned on the interactions between global health and the 
rise of Asia, sovereignty and institutional innovations. These papers will be published in an edited volume 
(Routledge, forthcoming).   
2 Classified by the IMF to include: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Vietnam 
3 All figures in purchasing power parity terms. 
4 For example, see Fidler (2007), Dodgson and Lee (2004) and Lee (2009).  
5 For example, see Walt et al 2009, and Walt and Buse (2006) 
6 Brazil, Russia, India and China 
7 The White Paper describes one of the basic features of China’s foreign aid policy as: ‘Imposing no political 
conditions. China upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects recipient countries' right to 
independently select their own path and model of development, and believes that every country should explore a 
development path suitable to its actual conditions. China never uses foreign aid as a means to interfere in 
recipient countries' internal affairs or seek political privileges for itself.’ 
8 In environmental governance, for example, Elliott (2003) criticizes the ‘anti-institutionalism’ displayed by 
ASEAN as becoming a growing obstacle to the cross-border cooperation needed to deal with environmental 
management.  
9 While SEARO played a technical role, ASEAN is more of a political platform. Discussions in these two 
institutions therefore played complementary roles in the FCTC negotiation process.   
10 See for example Fidler (2007); Lee (2009); Dodgson and Lee (2004); Ng and Ruger (2011) and Sridhar 
(2009).  
11 See for example Lee (2009); Thomas and Weber (2004); Fidler (2007); and Walt et al (2009).  
12 (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) non-
interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence. 
